Shareholder Wealth Effects of Corporate Sell-offs by Tsirimpasi, Eirini
	
	
	
	
Shareholder	Wealth	Effects	of	
Corporate	Sell-offs	
	
	
	
	
Eirini	Tsirimpasi	
	
	
SCHOOL	OF	ECONOMICS,	BUSINESS	ADMINISTRATION	&	LEGAL	STUDIES	
A	thesis	submitted	for	the	degree	of	
Master	of	Science	(MSc)	in	Banking	&	Finance	
	
	
December	2018	
Thessaloniki	-	Greece	
	 	
	 2	
Student	Name:	 Eirini	Tsirimpasi	
	
SID:	 1103170025	
Supervisor:	 Dr.	Apostolos	Dasilas	
	
	
	
	
	
	
I	hereby	declare	that	the	work	submitted	is	mine	and	that	where	I	have	made	use	of	
another’s	work,	I	have	attributed	the	source(s)	according	to	the	Regulations	set	in	the	
Student’s	Handbook.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
December	2018	
Thessaloniki	-	Greece	
	 	
	 3	
Abstract	
	
The	aim	of	this	study	is	to	examine	the	short-	and	long-run	shareholder	wealth	effects	
following	corporate	sell-offs.	In	particular,	a	sample	of	105	corporate	sell-offs	that	took	
place	in	the	US	between	2010	and	2015	is	collected	to	test	the	stock	market	reaction	of	
the	 initial	 sell-off	 announcement.	 Employing	 the	 classical	 event	 study	 methodology,	
significant	positive	price	movements	are	observed	for	the	parent	firms	on,	and	around	
the	announcement	date.	The	results	are	consistent	with	previous	studies	indicating	that	
shareholders	 generate	 wealth	 gains	 in	 the	 short	 horizon.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
insignificant	negative	price	movements	are	detected	for	up	to	two	years	 following	the	
initial	sell-off	announcement.	However,	the	positive	return	performance	from	6	months	
to	12	months	after	the	announcement	implies	that	shareholders	benefit	if	firms	manage	
to	 allocate	 efficiently	 the	 proceeds	 from	 the	 deal.	 Furthermore,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	
changes	in	the	operating	performance	of	sellers	are	not	significant,	the	results	provide	
evidence	that	sell-offs	improve	their	post	operating	performance.	
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1.	Introduction	
	
The	 wealth	 effects	 of	 corporate	 sell-offs	 on	 shareholder	 wealth	 have	 been	 studied	
thoroughly.	 These	 studies	 usually	 denote	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 shareholder	wealth	
resulting	 from	 sell-off	 announcements	 for	 the	 seller	 (e.g.	 Rosenfeld,	 1984;	 Jain,	 1985	
and	Hite,	Owers	and	Rogers,	1987),	as	well	for	the	buyer	(Hite	et	al.	1987).	Beside	short-
run	 performance,	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 initial	 market	 reaction	 to	 sell-off	
announcements	 may	 not	 disclose	 the	 complete	 impact	 of	 sell-offs,	 led	 to	 the	
investigation	of	 long-run	wealth	 effects	 subsequent	 to	 the	 announcement	 (e.g.	 Bates,	
2005).	
Although	 sell-off	 announcements	 have	 been	 associated	 with	 positive	 wealth	
gains	 for	 shareholders	 of	 the	 selling	 firm	 on	 the	 announcement	 day(s),	 an	 important	
issue	 to	 examine	 is	why	 firms	 choose	 to	 voluntary	 sell	 part	 of	 their	 assets	 in	 the	 first	
place.	 Prior	 studies	 have	 related	 the	 difference	 in	 announcement	 day	 effects	 among	
firms	engaged	in	sell-offs	with	the	intended	use	of	proceeds	(e.g.	John	and	Ofek,	1995)	
and,	moreover,	 further	 investigation	has	shown	that	several	 factors	beside	the	motive	
also	contribute	to	the	magnitude	of	wealth	gains	(e.g.	Klein,	1986).	
In	 contrast	 to	 short-run	 shareholder	wealth,	 the	 long-run	 performance	 of	 sell-
offs	has	been	far	less	examined.	Evidence	on	shareholder	wealth	following	sell-offs	has	
shown	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 shareholder	 wealth	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 use	 of	 the	
proceeds	 from	 the	 asset	 sale	 (Bates,	 2005).	 The	 empirical	 findings	 of	 an	 UK	 study	
indicate	that	sell-offs	are	negatively	related	to	shareholder	wealth	in	the	UK	irrespective	
of	 the	 allocation	 of	 the	 subsequent	 gains	 (Lee	 and	 Lin,	 2008).	However,	 a	 later	 study	
showed	 that	 shareholders	 benefit	 only	 if	 these	 proceeds	 are	 allocated	 efficiently	
(Francoeur	and	Niyubahwe,	2009).	
The	objective	of	 this	 study	 is	 to	examine	 the	pre-	 and	post-market	 reaction	 to	
the	announcement	of	corporate	sell-offs.	For	 this	purpose,	a	 sample	of	105	corporate	
sell-offs	that	took	place	in	the	US	between	2010	and	2015	and	a	sub-sample	of	73	sell-
offs	without	contaminated	announcements	around	the	announcement	day	are	selected.	
Using	the	classical	event	study	methodology,	the	stock	market	movements	of	the	firms	
that	 comprise	 the	 two	 samples	 are	 evaluated	 in	 order	 to	determine	whether	 sell-offs	
generate	wealth	 gains	 for	 the	 shareholders	of	 the	 selling	 firms,	both	 in	 the	 short	 and	
long	run.	 In	addition,	the	operating	performance	of	these	firms	 is	analyzed	 in	order	to	
ascertain	whether	the	disposal	of	assets	improved	their	profitability,	liquidity,	efficiency	
and	leverage	in	the	years	surrounding	the	initial	sell-off	announcement.	On	account	of	
this,	mean	and	median	changes	 for	different	 intervals	around	the	announcement	year	
are	tested	by	the	two-tailed	t-statistic	and	the	Wicoxon	signed	rank	test.	
The	findings	of	this	study	show	that	sell-off	announcements	produce	significantly	
positive	 abnormal	 returns	 around	 the	 announcement	 day,	 with	 abnormal	 returns	 of	
2.04%	 for	 the	 full	 sample	 and	 2.75%	 for	 the	 sub-sample	 These	 results	 are	 consistent	
with	previous	studies	and	indicate	that	sell-off	announcements	are	positively	related	to	
shareholder	 wealth.	 Regarding	 long-run	 returns,	 negative	 abnormal	 returns	 for	 up	 to	
two	years	following	the	initial	announcement	are	observed	for	6,	12,	18	and	24	months	
after	the	initial	announcement.	These	findings	are	partially	in	agreement	with	the	study	
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of	Lee	and	Lin,	2008,	which	found	significant	negative	abnormal	returns	up	to	five	years	
after	 the	 announcement.	 Nevertheless,	 buy-and-hold	 abnormal	 returns	 climb	 from	 -
3.12%	 to	 -1.28%	 for	 the	 full-sample	 and	 from	 -3.34%	 to	 -1.50%	 for	 the	 sub-sample	
between	 6	 and	 12	 months	 after	 the	 announcement,	 suggesting,	 in	 accordance	 to	
Francoeur	and	Niyubahwe,	2009,	that	sell-offs	create	shareholder	value	but	only	when	
the	proceeds	from	the	sell-off	are	allocated	efficiently.	Finally,	the	analysis	of	the	firms’	
operating	 performance	 yields	 mostly	 insignificant	 mean	 and	 median	 changes.	
Nevertheless,	the	results	 imply	that	sell-offs	have	a	positive	 impact	on	the	firms’	post-
performance	 contributing	 in	 the	 improvement	 of	 their	 profitability,	 liquidity	 and	
leverage	levels	and	retaining	their	efficiency	at	the	pre	sell-off	levels.	
The	next	 Section	provides	 a	 review	of	 the	 literature	on	 corporate	 sell-offs	 and	
the	remainder	of	this	study	is	structured	as	follows.	Section	3	covers	the	hypotheses	for	
the	study;	Section	4	describes	the	sample;	Section	5	explains	the	methodology;	Section	
6	 presents	 and	 discusses	 the	 empirical	 results	 and	 lastly	 Section	 7	 summarizes	 and	
concludes.	 	
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2.	Literature	review	
	
This	 section	 first	 defines	 sell-offs	 (Section	 2.1)	 and	 afterwards	 it	 enlarges	 upon	 the	
existing	 literature.	 Section	 2.2	 presents	 the	motives	 for	 sell-offs;	 Section	 2.3	 provides	
the	 explanations	 proposed	 to	 explain	 the	 wealth	 effects	 and	 Section	 2.4	 reviews	 the	
empirical	evidence	on	shareholder	wealth	effects.	
	
2.1	Definitions	and	Characteristics	of	Sell-offs	
	
A	sell-off	 is	a	 type	of	divesture	where	certain	assets	of	a	 firm	are	disposed	to	another	
firm.	 Assets	 being	 divested	 include	 the	 sale	 of	 subsidiaries,	 divisions	 or	 other	
combinations	of	fixed	assets	in	exchange	for	some	form	of	consideration	(cash,	assets	or	
securities	of	the	acquiring	firm).	A	sell-off	transaction	involves	three	parties,	the	selling	
firm	 (vendor),	 the	 asset	 being	 sold	 (target)	 and	 the	 acquirer,	 while	 the	 vendor	
relinquishes	both	the	ownership	and	the	control	of	the	asset.		
Other	 forms	 of	 divestitures	 are	 spin-offs	 and	 equity	 carve	 outs.	 In	 contrast	 to	
sell-offs,	in	spin-offs	the	divested	assets	become	a	newly	organized	firm	through	the	sale	
or	 distribution	 of	 new	 shares	 to	 the	 existing	 shareholders	 and	 equity	 carve-outs	 are	
initial	public	offerings	of	a	full	or	partial	interest	in	a	subsidiary.	Although	prior	research	
has	 examined	 the	 wealth	 effects	 of	 spin	 offs	 and	 equity	 carve	 outs,	 this	 study	
concentrates	solely	on	sell	offs.		
Sell-offs	can	be	separated	into	two	wider	groups,	voluntary	and	involuntary	sell-
offs.	Sell-offs	are	defined	as	voluntary	if	they	that	are	not	ordered	by	the	government.	
Since	involuntary	sell-offs	are	not	regarded	as	wealth	creating	transactions,	most	of	the	
existing	 literature	 has	 concentrated	mainly	 on	 voluntary	 sell-offs	 in	 order	 to	 examine	
shareholder	wealth	effects.	Therefore,	in	line	with	previous	studies,	this	study	will	also	
focus	only	on	the	wealth	effects	among	firms	that	engaged	in	voluntary	sell-offs.	
	
2.2	Motives	for	Sell-offs	
	
Prior	research	has	extensively	studied	the	reasons	behind	the	decision	of	firms	to	divest	
units	 of	 their	 business.	 These	 motives	 can	 be	 classified	 into	 two	 broader	 categories:	
firms	 that	 divest	 for	 financial	 reasons	 and	 firms	 that	 divest	 for	 strategic	 reasons.	 The	
following	paragraphs	provide	an	analysis	of	the	reasons	behind	sell-offs.	
One	motivation	for	sell-offs	offered	in	the	existing	literature	by	Hite	et	al.,	1987	
is	 the	 efficient	 deployment	 hypothesis.	 According	 to	 this	 theory,	 asset	 sales	 promote	
efficiency	 if	 they	are	more	valuable	to	another	organization.	Within	this	context,	 firms	
only	 maintain	 assets	 for	 which	 they	 have	 comparative	 advantage	 and	 dispose	 assets	
when	they	are	believed	to	be	more	valuable	to	other	firms.	However,	for	this	hypothesis	
to	 be	 effective,	 greater	 synergies	must	 exist	 for	 the	 acquiring	 entity	 in	 order	 to	 bid	 a	
higher	value	on	the	asset	than	its	 initial	value.	John	and	Ofek,	1995	support	partly	the	
efficient	deployment	hypothesis	citing	that	some	of	the	value	gains	of	their	findings	are	
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consistent	with	this	theory.	On	the	other	hand,	Lang,	Poulsen	and	Stulz,	1995	argue	with	
this	theory	reporting	evidence	that	is	inconsistent	with	the	above	theory.		
A	second	theory	behind	the	motives	of	sell-offs	is	the	financing	theory	advanced	
by	Lang,	Poulsen	and	Stulz,	1995.	This	theory	suggests	that	the	sale	of	an	asset	can	be	
viewed	as	a	financing	mechanism	for	firms	when	alternative	sources	of	financing	are	not	
affordable.	 The	 main	 empirical	 results	 of	 their	 study	 are	 in	 support	 of	 this	 theory.	
Specifically,	their	study	found	that	the	wealth	gains	for	firms	are	greater	when	the	cash	
proceeds	from	sell-offs	are	allocated	for	debt	repayment	and	less	for	firms	that	intend	
to	 reserve	 the	proceeds	 of	 asset	 sales.	 Furthermore,	 they	point	 out	 that	 firms,	which	
divest	assets,	are	typically	not	performing	well.	The	disposal	of	a	business	unit	in	order	
to	repay	debt	was	argued	by	Linn	and	Rozeff,	1984,	which	believe	that	 this	method	 is	
not	plausible	and	that	it	is	too	expensive	compared	to	other	sources	of	financing	(e.g.	an	
equity	issue).		
A	third	motive	 for	sell-offs	 is	 the	sale	of	assets	 that	underperform.	Ravenscraft	
and	 Scherer’s,	 1991	 analysis	 of	 motivations	 behind	 sell-offs	 showed	 that	 the	 main	
reason	behind	sell-offs	is	associated	with	the	poor	performance	of	these	business	lines.	
Despite	the	fact	that	their	results	support	the	efficient	deployment	theory,	their	study	
supports	that	the	motive	of	the	reallocation	of	assets	to	higher-valued	uses	is	the	assets’	
low	performance.	Later	on,	Guedes	and	Parayre,	1997	examined	two	different	samples,	
a	 sample	 of	 firms	 that	 announce	 to	 divest	 well-performing	 divisions	 and	 a	 second	
sample	of	firms	announcing	the	sale	of	poorly	performing	divisions.	Their	results	show	
that	the	sale	of	underperforming	units	conveys	no	news	about	the	division,	while	on	the	
contrary	 the	 sale	 of	 healthy	 business	 units	 is	 value-enhancing.	 The	 lack	 of	 the	
profitability	of	an	asset,	according	to	Linn	and	Rozeff,	1984,	should	not	be	resolved	by	
divesting	the	asset,	but	other	methods	should	be	examined	to	solve	the	problem.	
A	 forth	motive	 for	 sell-offs	 that	has	been	 studied	over	 the	past	decades	 is	 the	
increase	in	focus	of	firms	on	their	core	business.	Linn	and	Rozeff,	1984	stated	that	the	
disposal	of	assets	 that	are	unrelated	 to	 the	core	operations	of	 the	seller	 is	one	of	 the	
most	common	motives	for	sell-offs.	John	and	Ofek,	1995,	in	a	study	of	321	divestitures,	
found	 that	 firms,	 which	 decide	 to	 sell	 part	 of	 their	 assets	 in	 order	 to	 narrow	 their	
businesses’	focus,	have	greater	short-run	wealth	gains	and,	furthermore,	they	improve	
their	post-sale	performance	compared	to	firms	that	have	no	focus-increasing	divestiture	
intentions.	As	mentioned	earlier,	they	also	point	out	that	the	motive	of	focus-increasing	
divestitures	is	more	dominant	compared	to	the	efficient	deployment	hypothesis.		
Another	 motive	 for	 sell-offs	 is	 to	 raise	 capital	 in	 order	 to	 finance	 future	
investments.	 This	motive	 differs	 from	 the	 financing	 theory	where	 no	 long-term	 plans	
were	 assumed,	 including	 now	 that	 cash	 proceeds	 will	 be	 allocated	 for	 long-term	
performance	plans.	Tehranian,	Travlos	and	Waegelein’s,	1987	study	suggests	that	long-
term	performance	plans	should	be	seen	by	shareholders	as	an	effective	method	in	order	
to	increase	their	long-term	interest.	
To	conclude,	 the	sell-off	decision	by	firms	may	be	also	seen	as	an	antitakeover	
mechanism.	This	motive	has	been	granted	little	attention	in	the	literature	compared	to	
the	previously	mentioned	reasons	behind	sell-offs.	Markides	and	Berg,	1992	point	out	
which	divestments	 the	market	 views	 as	 value-enhancing	 and	what	 type	of	 divestiture	
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destroys	shareholder	value.	Their	example	showed	that	a	firm	undertaking	divestment	
in	 order	 to	 avoid	 antitakeover	 attacks	 not	 only	 does	 not	 create	 value	 but	 also	 rather	
destroys	 it.	 Loh,	Bezjak	and	Toms,	1995	examined	 the	differences	between	 firms	 that	
are	 subject	 to	 takeover	 speculations	before	 the	 sell-off	 announcement	 and	 firms	 that	
are	not.	 Their	 findings	 indicate	 that	 sell-off	 announcements	of	 firms	with	no	 takeover	
speculations	 are	 related	 to	 significant	 wealth	 gains	 compared	 to	 firms	 with	 takeover	
rumors	 before	 the	 announcement.	 Finally,	 MacKinnon,	 2002	 studied	 the	 effect	 of	
takeover	 threats	 of	 voluntary	 sell-offs	 on	 the	 divestitures’	 announcement.	His	 sample	
revealed	 positive	 wealth	 gains	 for	 the	 selling	 firms	 on	 the	 announcement,	 while	 the	
analysis	of	a	second	sample,	which	contained	only	the	firms	of	the	overall	sample	that	
faced	a	takeover	threat	within	the	year	prior	the	sell-off	announcement,	turned	out	to	
reduce	shareholder	wealth.	
	
2.3	Sources	of	Wealth	Gains	
	
Along	with	the	motives	for	sell-offs,	academic	research	has	also	focused	on	the	factors	
that	influence	the	valuation	consequences	of	corporate	sell-offs.	The	paragraphs	below	
describe	the	procedure	and	the	outcome	of	these	studies.	
Hearth	and	Zaima,	1984	showed	that	 important	determinants	 in	value	creation	
of	voluntary	sell-offs	are	the	relative	size	of	the	disposed	asset	and	the	financial	strength	
of	the	selling	firm.	According	to	their	study,	sellers	with	strong	financial	position	and	the	
sale	of	 larger	portions	of	assets	result	 in	greater	economic	gains	for	shareholders.	The	
method	used	in	their	study	to	calculate	the	relative	size,	 is	the	ratio	of	the	announced	
value	 to	 total	 assets	 of	 the	 seller.	 In	 addition,	 the	 financial	 status	 of	 the	 firms	 was	
measured	using	 the	Standard	&	Poors	bond	ratings,	 ranking	 firms	with	A+,	A,	or	A-	as	
“good”	and	below	A-	as	“poor”.	
Klein,	 1986	examined	 the	 form	and	 content	of	 sell-announcements.	 She	 found	
evidence	 consistent	 with	 prior	 studies	 that	 relate	 the	 size	 of	 the	 sell-off	 to	 positive	
market	 movements.	 Moreover,	 she	 divided	 a	 sample	 of	 voluntary	 sell-off	
announcements	 into	 two	 subsamples	 based	 on	whether	 the	 announcement	 discloses	
the	 transaction	 price.	 Her	 findings	 support	 that	 the	 disclosure	 of	 the	 sales	 price	
constitute	a	factor	that	affects	the	wealth	gains	of	sell-off	announcements.	The	measure	
of	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 divesting	 asset	 used	 by	 Klein,	 1986	 is	 the	 announced	
transaction	price	divided	by	the	market	value	of	the	selling	firm’s	common	shares,	based	
on	the	last	trading	day	of	the	month	before	the	sell-off	announcement.	Similarly,	Afshar,	
Taffler	 and	 Sudarsaman,	 1992	 studied	 a	 sample	 of	 UK	 firms	 and	 their	 results	 are	
consistent	with	the	results	of	Klein,	1986.	More	precisely,	they	found	that	wealth	gains	
are	highest	when	the	completion	of	the	sell-off	was	announced	and	only	if	the	price	was	
disclosed.		
Tehranian	et	al.,	1987	questioned	the	association	of	long-run	performance	plans	
and	 wealth	 effects	 of	 a	 sample	 comprised	 of	 146	 firms.	 The	 outcome	 of	 their	 study	
showed	 that	 firms,	 which	 compensate	 their	 executives	 with	 long-term	 performance	
plans,	are	rewarded	with	higher	gains	than	firms	with	no	future	investment	plans.	
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Hirschey	and	Zaima,	1989	 studied	 the	 impact	of	 insider	 trading	and	ownership	
structure	 in	 relation	 with	 sell-off	 announcements.	 Their	 study	 reports	 favorable	
assessment	of	corporate	sell-off	decisions	for	firms	with	net-buy	activity	during	the	prior	
six-month	period	preceding	the	sell-off	announcement.	Moreover,	 the	wealth	gains	of	
sell-off	decisions	for	closely	held	firms	showed	to	be	even	more	favorable	compared	to	
widely	held	firms.		
Hirschey,	 Slovin	 and	 Zaima,	 1990	 tested	 the	 relation	 of	 banks’	 monitoring	
functions	with	market	movements	of	sell-off	announcements.	They	presented	evidence	
that	 firms	 with	 higher	 bank	 loan	 are	 accompanied	 with	 higher	 returns	 compared	 to	
those	 with	 little	 or	 no	 bank	 debt.	 In	 their	 opinion,	 the	market	 has	 a	more	 favorable	
reaction	to	firms	with	bank	loans	in	contrast	to	other	types	of	debt.		
Sicherman	 and	 Pettway,	 1992	 examined	 a	 sample	 of	 278	 sell-offs	 and	 their	
findings	 agree	with	 the	 study	of	Klein,	 1986	 that	 selling	 firms	experience	higher	 gains	
when	the	transaction	price	 is	disclosed.	Furthermore,	 their	study	suggests	that	sellers,	
which	 had	 credit	 downgrades	 during	 the	 two	 years	 prior	 the	 announcement,	 receive	
lower	 gains	 than	 the	 selling	 firms	 that	 had	 not	 been	 downgraded.	 The	measurement	
used	by	Sicherman	and	Pettway,	1992	for	the	grading	of	the	financial	condition	of	the	
firms	was	based	on	Moody’s	and/or	Standard	&	Poor’s	investment	service.	
Steiner,	1997	analyzed	the	determinants	of	corporate	sell-off	announcements	of	
a	 sample	 of	 diversified	 firms.	 His	 results	 indicate	 that	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 sell-off	 is	
significantly	 positive	 related	 to	 debt	 and	 the	 number	 of	 business	 segments,	 and	
significantly	negative	related	to	firm	performance	and	the	level	of	ownership	by	officers	
and	directors.	The	measurement	of	performance	and	financial	distress	used	by	Steiner,	
1997	are	the	operating	profit	margin	and	long-term	debt	to	total	assets	respectively.	
Lastly,	 non-US	 studies	 contribute	 to	 the	 literature	 providing	 evidence	 of	
additional	value	creating	drivers.	Alexandrou	and	Sudarsanam’s,	2001	study	of	a	 large	
sample	of	UK	firms	found	that	selling	firms	benefit	more	in	time	of	recession	rather	than	
in	 booming	 economic	 conditions.	 Further,	 they	 found	 that	 value	 gains	 are	 greater	 for	
firms	when	the	acquiring	firm	is	based	in	a	different	country	than	the	target’s	one.	One	
year	 later,	 Clubb	 and	 Stouraitis,	 2002,	 which	 also	 used	 a	 sample	 of	 UK	 firms	 in	 their	
paper,	 related	 higher	 gains	 of	 asset	 sales	 to	 the	 information	 that	 is	 included	 in	 the	
profitability	of	the	sale.		
	
2.4	Evidence	on	Wealth	Gains	
	
To	provide	a	clearer	view	of	the	evidence	on	wealth	gains,	this	section	is	separated	into	
the	short-	and	the	long-run	return	performance.	
2.4.1	Short-run	Return	Performance	
	
Empirical	 results	 of	 existing	 studies	 on	 voluntary	 sell	 of	 announcements	 indicate	 that	
sell-off	 announcements	 are	 associated	with	 positive	 stock	market	movements	 around	
the	 initial	 announcement	 day(s)	 for	 the	 selling	 firm.	 Moreover,	 several	 studies	 have	
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related	 the	positive	adoption	of	a	 sell-off	announcement	by	 the	market	 to	 the	 factors	
analyzed	above.		
Rosenfeld,	 1984,	 Jain,	 1985	and	Hite	et	 al.,	 1987	document	 significant	positive	
abnormal	 returns	 on	 the	 announcement	 day(s),	 whereas	 Alexander,	 Benson	 &	
Kampmeyer,	 1984	 found	 positive	 but	 insignificant	 abnormal	 returns	 during	 the	
announcement	 period.	 In	 addition,	 Hite	 et	 al.,	 1987	 states	 that	 abnormal	 returns	 are	
higher	 for	 successful	 sellers	 than	 for	 unsuccessful	 sellers,	while	 both	Alexander	 et	 al.,	
1984	 and	 Jain,	 1985	 report	 that	 sell-offs	most	 frequently	 follow	 a	 period	 of	 negative	
abnormal	 returns.	 In	 another	 study,	 Hearth	 and	 Zaima,	 1984	 found	 larger	 abnormal	
returns	for	firms	that	sell	a	 large	portion	of	their	assets.	Klein,	1986	reports	significant	
positive	price	movements	 in	announced	 transaction	price	 sell	offs,	while	Hirschey	and	
Zaima,	 1989	 found	 positive	 returns	 at	 the	 sell-off	 announcement	 for	 firms	 disclosing	
negotiations.	 Finally,	 Sichermann	 and	 Pettway,	 1992	 document	 greater	 two-day	
announcement	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 for	 the	 selling	 firms	 that	 had	 no	 credit	
downgrades	 two	 years	 prior	 the	 announcement.	 An	 overview	 of	 these	 studies	 is	
depicted	 in	 Table	 1	 below.	 For	 consistency,	 all	 studies	 show	 cumulative	 abnormal	
returns	over	the	two-day	announcement	period.	
	
	
Table	1	US	evidence	on	voluntary	sell-offs	
Author(s)	
Sample	
size	
Period	
studied	 Methodology	 Period	
Abnormal	
returns	
Alexander,	Benson	&	
Kampmeyer	(1984)	 53	 1964-1973	 MAR	 (-1,0)	 0.17%	
Rosenfeld	(1984)	 62	 1963-1981	 MAR	 (-1,0)	 2.33%	
Jain	(1985)	 1064	 1976-1978	 MAR	 (-1,0)	 0.53%	
Hearth	&	Zaima	(1986)	 75	 1979-1982	 MAR	 (-1,0)	 1.42%	
Klein	(1986)	 202	 1970-1979	 MM	 (-1,0)	 0.72%	
Hite,	Owers	&	Rogers	(1987)	 55	 1963-1978	 MM	 (-1,0)	 1.66%	
Hirschey	&	Zaima	(1989)	 64	 1975-1982	 MM	 (-1,0)	 1.64%	
Sicherman	&	Pettway	(1992)	 278	 1981-1987	 MM	 (-1,0)	 0.92%	
Note:	MM	is	the	market	model	and	MAR	is	the	mean-adjusted	returns	model	
Source:	Author’s	own	creation	
	
	
2.4.2	Long-run	Return	Performance	
	
Compared	to	short-run	wealth	effects,	there	is	less	evidence	in	the	existing	literature	of	
the	long-run	wealth	effects	of	voluntary	sell-off	announcements.			
Bates,	2005	supports	that	the	impact	of	sell-offs	is	only	partly	incorporated	in	the	
announcement	 returns.	 His	 study	 of	 a	 US	 sample	 of	 400	 asset	 sales	 reveal	 positive	
abnormal	 returns	up	 to	 two	years	 following	 the	sale	announcement	among	 firms	 that	
retain	 the	proceeds	 for	 subsequent	 investment	 and	 insignificantly	 different	 from	 zero	
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for	those	of	the	firms	that	distribute	the	proceeds	to	debt	or	equity.	As	he	notes,	these	
results	provide	evidence	that	the	financial	efficiency	benefit	is	greater	than	the	agency	
costs	 of	 managerial	 discretion.	 The	 method	 applied	 in	 Bates’,	 2005	 study	 is	 the	
macroeconomic-based	factor	model	(Eckbo,	Masoulis	and	Norli,	2000).	
In	 another	 study,	 Lee	 and	 Lin,	 2008	 also	 examined	 the	 long-run	 return	
performance	 following	 sell-off	 announcements	of	 a	 sample	of	UK	 firms	 that	 intend	 to	
use	the	proceeds	from	the	sale	either	for	investment	or	debt	reduction.	They	measured	
the	 long-run	 return	performance	by	 the	 cumulative	 average	 abnormal	 returns	 (CAAR)	
benchmarked	on	the	Fama	and	French,	1996	three-factor	model.	Their	study’s	outcome	
revealed	negative	abnormal	returns	for	up	to	five	years	after	the	sell-offs	among	both	
investment	and	debt	reduction	sellers.	According	to	their	paper,	their	results	imply	that	
sell-offs	in	the	UK	do	not	create	shareholder	value	in	the	long-run	and	signify	that	sellers	
are	 systematically	 connected	 to	 lower	 returns	 given	 their	 exposure	 to	 the	 risk	 factors	
specified	 in	 the	 Fama	 and	 French,	 1996	 model.	 Furthermore,	 they	 suggest	 that	 the	
difference	 between	 their	 results	 and	 those	 of	 Bates,	 2005	may	 be	 due	 to	 the	 unlike	
incentives	 and	 characteristics	 of	 UK	 and	US	 firms	 and/or	 the	 different	model	 used	 in	
their	studies.	
Finally,	 Francoeur	 and	 Niyubahwe,	 2009	 studied	 the	 level	 of	 long-run	 returns	
subsequent	to	sell-offs	announcements	using	a	Canadian	sample	of	corporate	sell-offs.		
Their	research	is	based	on	buy-and-hold	abnormal	returns	following	a	method	similar	to	
the	methodology	described	by	Barber	and	Lyon,	1997.	The	purpose	of	their	study	was	to	
examine	whether	sell-offs	lead	to	the	creation	or	destruction	of	shareholder	wealth	up	
to	 three	 years	 after	 the	 sell-off,	 as	 well	 as	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 connection	 between	
abnormal	 returns	 and	 the	 investment	 behavior	 of	 firms.	 	 Their	 results	 indicate	 no	
significant	abnormal	returns	(positive	or	negative)	in	the	post	divestiture	period	for	the	
whole	 sample,	nor	 for	 the	 sub-samples	of	 firms	 that	 improve	or	do	not	 improve	 their	
capital	 allocation.	 As	 they	 state,	 the	 lack	 of	 abnormal	 returns	 suggests	 that	 Canadian	
firms	manage	to	keep	up	with	the	performance	of	their	peers	within	the	same	industrial	
sector	during	the	post	divestiture	period.	A	further	analysis	showed	that	the	variation	of	
long-run	post	sell-off	performance	is	significantly	and	positively	correlated	to	the	ability	
of	 the	 parent	 firm	 to	 allocate	 efficiently	 internal	 capital	markets.	 In	 other	words,	 the	
creation	of	long-term	shareholder	wealth	of	firms	that	sell	off	a	portion	of	their	assets	
depends	on	how	well	these	firms	manage	their	internal	capital	market.	
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3.	Hypotheses	
	
This	Section	raises	the	testable	hypotheses	for	this	study.	Two	similar	hypotheses	will	be	
advanced	in	order	to	study	the	short-	and	long-run	announcement	effects	of	corporate	
sell-offs	and	a	third	hypothesis	will	be	used	to	examine	whether	sell-off	announcements	
are	associated	with	changes	in	the	selling	firms’	value.		
	
3.1	Short-term	Announcement	Effects	
	
As	shown	in	the	literature	review,	voluntary	sell-off	announcements	result	in	abnormal	
returns	 for	 shareholders	 around	 the	 initial	 announcement	 day(s).	 Since	 this	 paper	
studies	 also	 whether	 sell-off	 announcements	 create	 shareholder	 value	 at	 their	
announcement,	a	testable	hypothesis	needs	to	be	defined.	Furthermore,	stock	market	
effects	will	be	tested	for	several	small	time	intervals	surrounding	the	announcement	day	
in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 before,	 around	 and	 after	 the	
announcement.	The	respective	hypothesis	is:	
	 𝐻! 	:	 The	 announcement	 of	 sell-offs	 does	 not	 generate	 short-run	 abnormal	
returns	for	the	selling	firms.	
	
3.2	Long-term	Announcement	Effects	
	
The	second	 topic	under	analysis	of	 this	 study	 is	whether	 sell-off	announcements	have	
long-run	wealth	impact	for	shareholders.	Therefore,	stock	market	effects	will	be	tested	
for	 several	 periods	 after	 the	 initial	 announcement.	 The	 research	 question	 can	 be	
formulated	into	the	following	testable	hypothesis:	
	 𝐻!	:	The	announcement	of	sell-offs	does	not	generate	long-run	abnormal	returns	
for	the	selling	firms.	
	
3.3	Operating	Performance	Effects	
	
The	 last	 issue	 examined	 in	 this	 study	 is	 whether	 sell-offs	 improve	 the	 long-term	
operating	performance	of	the	seller.	A	specific	number	of	characteristics	of	the	firms	will	
be	 tested	 over	 different	 periods	 in	 order	 to	 observe	 any	 variations	 in	 their	 value	
comparing	their	pre-	and	post-performance.	The	characteristics	are	the	profitability,	the	
efficiency,	the	liquidity	and	the	leverage.	For	each	characteristic	the	respective	research	
hypothesis	can	be	expressed	as:	
	 𝐻!:	Sell-offs	do	not	contribute	in	the	improvement	of	the	firms’	value.		
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4.	Sample	and	Data	
	
The	next	section	describes	the	sample	selection	procedure	for	this	study	and	Section	4.2	
provides	a	more	detailed	view	of	the	properties	of	the	final	sample.	
	
4.1	Sample	Description	
	
This	 study	 is	 based	 on	 voluntary	 corporate	 sell-offs	 of	 US	 high	 technology	 firms	 that	
announced	 the	 divestiture	 between	 January	 1,	 2010	 and	 December	 31,	 2015.	 The	
industry-specific	criteria	of	the	firms	was	selected	in	order	to	provide	consistency	of	the	
firms	within	the	sample,	whereas	the	period	under	analysis	was	partly	chosen	because	
firms	must	be	 listed	 for	3	years	after	 the	 sell-off	 so	 that	data	 for	 the	 long-term	study	
would	be	available.	As	mentioned	before,	to	be	included	in	the	sample,	the	parent	firm	
must	 be	 classified	 as	 high	 technology	 firm	according	 to	 the	 Thomson	 Financial	Macro	
Industry.	 Furthermore,	 the	 sample	 was	 restricted	 to	 only	 completed	 deals	 since	 this	
study’s	aim	is	to	examine	both	the	short-	and	long-term	wealth	of	sell-offs	and	therefore	
the	divestiture	had	to	successful.	The	deals	 included	had	also	to	transfer	the	complete	
control	of	the	divested	asset	to	the	acquirer.	Another	constraint	imposed	was	that	these	
transactions	should	have	a	value	of	over	$10mil.	In	order	to	ensure	the	deal	will	produce	
a	 market	 reaction.	 This	 cut-off	 value	 is	 consistent	 with	 previous	 studies	 (e.g.	 Jain	
(1985)).	 The	 initial	 sample	 obtained	 from	 the	 Thomson	 Financial	 Mergers	 and	
Acquisitions’	 database	 consisted	 of	 213	 completed	 voluntary	 divestitures	 between	
January	 1,	 2010	 and	 December	 31,	 2015	 by	 US	 publicly	 listed	 high	 technology	 firms,	
whose	deal	value	exceeded	$10	mil	and	where	the	control	was	shifted	to	the	acquirer.	
From	 this	data	 source,	 the	 initial	 sample	was	 further	 limited	by	deleting	17	 leveraged	
buyout,	 12	 spin-off	 and	 1	 sale	 and	 leaseback	 transactions,	 as	 well	 as	 5	 transactions	
associated	with	bankruptcy	or	 liquidation	of	 the	parent	 firm	and	2	divestitures	where	
neither	 of	 the	 parents	 had	 complete	 control	 over	 the	 divested	 asset	 (joint	 ventures).	
These	 restrictions	 are	 in	 line	with	 the	definitions	 given	 in	 Section	 2.1	 and	 the	 sample	
selection	procedure	of	 previous	 studies.	 Finally,	 3	 transactions	where	double	 listed	 in	
the	sample	and	therefore	not	included.	This	process	reduced	the	sample	to	173	sell-offs	
over	the	sample	period.	
Historical	daily	returns	and	accounting	data	for	parent	firms	were	collected	from	
Thomson	Reuters	 Eikon.	 This	 platform	 includes	 data	 on	 financial	markets,	 companies’	
financial	 data,	 etc.	Only	 firms	 that	 had	 their	 stock	 continuously	 listed	on	 the	NYSE	or	
NASDAQ	 for	 3	 years	 before	 and	 after	 the	 sell-off	 announcement	 and	 those	 with	
available	 return	data	were	 retained	 in	 the	 final	 sample.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	above-
mentioned	criteria	of	the	completed	sell-offs	had	to	match	with	data	of	Eikon	in	order	to	
be	included	in	the	study.	These	additional	limitations	resulted	in	the	final	sample	of	105	
sell-offs.	
Due	to	the	fact	that	several	firms	potentially	proceeded	to	more	than	one	deal	
announcement	 surrounding	 the	 initial	 sell-off,	 together	 with	 the	 final	 sample,	 a	 sub-
sample	was	constructed	to	prevent	the	performance	related	to	those	other	events	from	
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causing	 misleading	 results.	 This	 sub-sample	 was	 derived	 from	 the	 final	 sample	 by	
selecting	only	sell-off	announcements	with	no	contaminated	announcement	within	the	
period	 of	 20	 days	 centered	 on	 the	 initial	 announcement	 date.	 A	 contaminating	
announcement	is	defined	as	another	company	deals’	announcement	(e.g.	another	sell-
off,	 an	acquisition	or	 a	 spin-off	 announcement,	 share	buyback	announcements).	After	
subtracting	sell-offs	with	contaminated	announcements	 in	 the	 (-10.	+10)	 interval	 from	
the	 overall	 sample,	 the	 second	 sample,	which	will	 be	 examined	 parallel	 to	 the	whole	
sample	included	73	sell-offs.	
	
4.2	Descriptive	Statistics	
	
Table	 2	 presents	 the	distribution	of	 the	 two	 final	 samples	 over	 the	period	 2010-2015	
and	is	separated	into	two	panels.	Panel	A	concentrates	on	selected	statistics	for	the	full	
sample,	while	Panel	B	provides	the	same	statistics	for	the	sample	without	contaminated	
announcements.	
The	annual	distribution	of	the	full	sample	shows	that	there	are	approximately	18	
completed	sell-offs	by	US	High	Technology	firms	per	year	on	average	with	a	maximum	of	
24	 in	2012	and	a	minimum	of	13	 in	2010.	The	total	value	of	all	105	announcements	 is	
almost	$28.5	billion	with	an	average	of	$271.331	mil	per	announcement.	The	average	
value	of	the	divested	assets	was	remarkably	greater	in	2014	and	2015	compared	to	the	
other	years.	That	can	be	explained	by	looking	at	the	column	of	the	maximum	deal	value,	
where	 the	evidence	 shows	 that	 the	deal	with	 the	 first	 and	 second	highest	 value	 took	
place	in	2014	and	2015.	The	largest	deal	was	the	sale	of	Motorola	Mobility	Holdings	of	
Google	for	$3,088.795	mil	in	January	2014.	
Panel	 B	 will	 be	 analyzed	 in	 comparison	 to	 Panel	 A	 in	 order	 to	 get	 a	 general	
overview	of	the	differences	to	the	full	sample,	which	may	have	an	effect	on	the	results	
of	the	empirical	study	between	these	two	samples.	Beginning	with	the	number	of	sell-
offs	per	year,	having	subtracted	32	announcements	of	the	overall	sample	did	not	have	a	
significant	change	on	the	percentage	of	sell-offs	per	year	for	the	sub-sample.	However,	
the	average	deal	value	for	the	sub-sample	has	dropped	for	all	years	in	the	period	2011	
to	2015,	while	only	in	2010	this	figure	is	greater	for	the	sub-sample.	That	difference	is	of	
significant	remark,	since	a	sample	with	 lower	mean	deal	value	may	not	create	as	high	
market	reactions	as	compared	to	a	sample	with	larger	by	value	deals.	
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Table	2	Sample	distribution	by	announcement	year	
Panel	A	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	
No.	of	
sell-offs	
%	of	
sample	
Total	deal	
value	(mil	$)	
Mean	deal	
value	(mil	$)	
Max	deal	value	
(mil	$)	
Min	deal	
value	(mil	$)	
2010	 13	 12,38%	 3.221,821	 247,832	 1.280,000	 27,800	
2011	 17	 16,19%	 1.944,400	 114,376	 480,000	 10,000	
2012	 24	 22,86%	 6.677,253	 278,219	 2.377,232	 11,500	
2013	 18	 17,14%	 2.698,205	 149,900	 725,000	 10,847	
2014	 15	 14,29%	 6.735,567	 449,038	 3.088,795	 10,000	
2015	 18	 17,14%	 7.212,463	 400,692	 3.041,840	 14,000	
Total	 105	 100%	 28.489,709	 271,331	 10.992,867	 84,147	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	
No.	of	
sell-offs	
%	of	
sample	
Total	deal	
value	(mil	$)	
Mean	deal	
value	(mil	$)	
Max	deal	value	
(mil	$)	
Min	deal	
value	(mil	$)	
2010	 8	 10,96%	 2.135,800	 266,975	 1.280,000	 27,800	
2011	 11	 15,07%	 859,400	 78,127	 185,000	 10,000	
2012	 16	 21,92%	 1.678,079	 104,880	 800,000	 11,500	
2013	 13	 17,81%	 1.145,672	 88,129	 203,625	 10,847	
2014	 12	 16,44%	 1.574,894	 131,241	 650,000	 10,000	
2015	 13	 17,81%	 2.756,923	 212,071	 1.799,968	 14,000	
Total	 73	 100%	 10.150,768	 139,052	 4.918,593	 84,147	
	
	
Table	 3	 shows	 descriptive	 statistics	 of	 the	 overall	 sample	 for	 sellers’	 mid	 industry	
classification	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 sell-offs	 by	 parent	 firms	 according	 to	 their	 mid	
industry.	The	total	number	of	selling	firms	involved	in	sell-offs	is	74.	
As	 previously	 noted,	 the	 sample	 contains	 only	 firms	 listed	 as	 High	 Technology	
according	 to	 Thomson	 Financial	 Mergers	 and	 Acquisitions’	 database.	 Splitting	 the	
industry	 from	 macro	 to	 mid	 industry	 further	 specifies	 this	 classification.	 Thomson	
Financial	Macro	Industry	is	divided	into	10	sub-industries,	which	are	reported	in	the	first	
column	of	the	table.	
The	 greatest	 proportion	 of	 sell-offs	 arises	 in	 relation	 to	 firms	 classified	 in	 the	
Semiconductors	 mid	 industry	 with	 21	 out	 of	 74	 firms	 and	 28	 respective	 sell-offs.	
Secondly,	16	firms	are	concerned	with	Computers	&	Peripherals	and	these	firms	count	
23	sell-offs.	Lower	on	the	scale	are	firms	related	to	the	Electronics	mid	industry,	9	firms	
proceeded	to	sell-offs	and	only	to	1	each	of	them.	Next,	10.81%	out	of	the	total	 firms	
derive	 from	 the	 Internet	 Software	 &	 Services	 and	 IT	 Consulting	 &	 Services’	 industry,	
corresponding	 to	 11	 and	 16	 sell-offs	 respectively.	 For	 the	 next	 three	 mid	 industries	
(Software,	E-commerce/B2B	and	Other	High	Technology)	the	number	of	firms	is	equal	in	
value	 to	 7,	 4	 and	 1,	with	 10,	 5	 and	 3	 respective	 sell-offs.	 Finally,	 none	 of	 the	 overall	
quantity	 of	 firms	 are	 engaged	 with	 Hardware	 and	 Internet	 Infrastructure,	 thus,	 the	
percentage	of	sell-offs	in	these	two	classifications	is	zero.	 	
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Table	3	Sample	distribution	by	mid	industry	
Thomson	Financial	Mid	Industry		 No.	of	firms	 %	of	firms	 No.	of	sell-offs	 %	of	sell-offs	
Computers	&	Peripherals	 16	 21.62%	 23	 21.90%	
E-commerce	/	B2B	 4	 5.41%	 5	 4.76%	
Electronics	 9	 12.16%	 9	 8.57%	
Hardware	 0	 0%	 0	 0%	
Internet	Infrastructure	 0	 0%	 0	 0%	
Internet	Software	&	Services	 8	 10.81%	 11	 10.48%	
IT	Consulting	&	Services	 8	 10.81%	 16	 15.24%	
Other	High	Technology	 1	 1.35%	 3	 2.86%	
Semiconductors	 21	 28.38%	 28	 26.67%	
Software	 7	 9.46%	 10	 9.52%	
Total	 74	 100%	 105	 100%	
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5.	Methodology	
	
In	order	to	study	the	hypotheses	of	Section	3	for	the	two	samples	of	this	study,	at	this	
point,	the	necessary	methodologies	have	to	be	introduced.	
Section	5.1	describes	the	methodology	for	short-term	shareholder	wealth	gains	
subsequent	to	sell-off	announcements,	Section	5.2	for	the	respective	long-term	wealth	
gains	and	Section	5.3	presents	the	methodology	for	the	post-sell-off	firm	performance.	
Note	that	all	the	tests	below	are	performed	for	both	the	full	sample	and	the	sub-sample;	
hence,	the	word	“sample”	in	this	section	refers	to	the	particular	sample	under	analysis.	
	
5.1	Short-run	Event	Study	
	
To	 examine	 the	 short-term	 return	 performance	 surrounding	 sell-off	 announcements,	
the	 market	 reaction	 of	 these	 announcements	 is	 tested	 using	 the	 event	 study	
methodology	 (Brown	 and	Warner,	 1985).	 For	 this	 purpose,	 daily	 historical	 stock	 price	
data	had	been	collected	from	250	days	before	to	10	days	after	each	announcement	for	
every	 single	 sell-off	 and	 the	 event	 date	 (day	 zero)	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 announcement	
business	 day	 (for	 announcements	 on	 a	 non-trading	 day	 the	 event	 date	 is	 the	 next	
available	business	day).	Concurrently,	as	the	S&P	500	Index	is	used	as	the	proxy	for	the	
market	portfolio,	 for	 every	 sell-off	 the	 respective	data	of	 the	 S&P	500	 Index	was	also	
retrieved.	 The	 selling	 firms’	 abnormal	 daily	 returns	 (ARs)	 for	 each	 announcement	 are	
estimated	 over	 the	 event	 window	 (-10,	 +10)	 using	 two	 different	models,	 the	market	
model	and	the	market-adjusted	model.	The	reason	why	both	methods	are	applied	is	to	
support	the	robustness	of	the	results	of	this	study.	In	addition,	the	parameters	for	the	
market	model	are	estimated	over	a	period	that	extends	from	250	days	before	to	10	days	
before	the	initial	announcement	on	day	zero	and	is	called	estimation	period.	In	contrast	
to	 the	market	model,	 the	market-adjusted	model	 does	 not	 encompass	 an	 estimation	
period,	which	may	enclose	other	sell-off	announcements	or	firm	deal	announcements	in	
general.	
	 The	steps	followed	by	the	market	and	the	market-adjusted	model	are	described	
below.	
	
Market	model	approach	
	
The	abnormal	return	for	firm	𝑖	on	day	𝑡	is:	
	 𝐴𝑅!,! = 𝑅!,! − (𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑅!,!)	
	
where	𝑅!,!		 is	the	actual	logarithmic	return	on	seller	𝑖	of	the	sample.	
	 𝑅!,!	 is	the	actual	logarithmic	return	on	the	S&P	500	index.	
	 𝑎, 𝑏	 are	 the	 estimated	 by	 the	 ordinary	 least	 squares	 (OLS)	 regression	
coefficients	of	the	sample	over	the	(-250,	-11)	interval.	
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The	 null	 hypothesis	 of	 Section	 3.1	 is	 tested	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 whether	 sell-off	
announcements	produce	abnormal	returns	for	the	firm	in	the	short	horizon,	which	is	the	
interval	(-10,+10)	around	the	announcement	day.	The	null	hypothesis	is	tested	using	the	𝑡-test	and	the	respective	formula	to	calculate	the	test	statistic	is:	
	 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  𝐴𝑅!𝜎(𝐴𝑅!")	
	
where	𝐴𝑅!		 is	 the	 average	 abnormal	 return	 for	 the	 sample	 on	 day	𝑡	(abnormal	
returns	were	trimmed	by	2%	to	exclude	outliers).	
	 𝜎(𝐴𝑅!")	 	is	the	estimated	standard	deviation	of	the	average	abnormal	return	for	
the	sample	over	the	estimation	period	
	 	 (abnormal	returns	were	trimmed	by	2%	to	exclude	outliers).	
	
	
Market-adjusted	model	approach	
	
The	abnormal	return	for	firm	𝑖	on	day	𝑡	is:	
	 𝐴𝑅!,! = 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!,!	
	
where	𝑅!,!		 is	the	actual	logarithmic	return	on	seller	𝑖	of	the	sample.	
	 𝑅!,!	 is	the	actual	logarithmic	return	on	the	S&P	500	index.	
	
As	in	the	case	of	the	market	model,	a	relative	𝑡-test	formula	is	needed	in	order	to	test	
hypothesis	𝐻!	for	the	market-adjusted	model.	The	respective	test	statistic	 is	calculated	
as	below:	
	 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  𝐴𝑅!𝜎(𝐴𝑅!)	
	
where		𝐴𝑅!		 is	 the	 average	 abnormal	 return	 for	 the	 sample	 on	 day	𝑡	(abnormal	
returns	were	trimmed	by	2%	to	exclude	outliers).	
	 𝜎(𝐴𝑅!)	 	is	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 average	 abnormal	 return	 for	 the	
sample	on	day	𝑡.	
	
	
For	 both	 models,	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 (CARs)	 are	 calculated	 for	 the	 event	
window,	as	well	as	for	several,	different	in	length,	windows	surrounding	the	event	date.	
Different	 in	 length	windows	are	used	to	provide	consistency	with	the	respective	event	
windows	 of	 previous	 studies	 in	 order	 to	 be	 easily	 compared	 with	 the	 results	 of	 this	
study.	CARs	are	computed	by	cumulating	the	ARs	as	shown	in	the	next	formula:	
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𝐶𝐴𝑅! =  𝐴𝑅!!!!! 	
	
where	T	is	the	event	window	(-10,	-1),	(+1,	10),	(-5,	+5),	(-5,	-1),	(+1,	+5),	(-1,	+1),	and	(-1,	
0)	respectively.	
	
Similar	 to	 abnormal	 returns,	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 are	 tested	 to	 determine	
whether	 they	 are	 significantly	 different	 from	 zero	 or	 not,	 hence,	 if	 sell-off	
announcements	 produce	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 over	 a	 certain	 time	 period.	
Again,	the	𝑡-test	is	used	for	this	purpose	and	the	respective	test	statistic	is	given	by:	
	 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  𝐶𝐴𝑅!𝑇𝜎(𝐴𝑅!")	
	
if	abnormal	returns	had	been	calculated	by	the	market	model	and	
	 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  𝐶𝐴𝑅!𝑇𝜎(𝐴𝑅!)	
	
if	abnormal	returns	had	been	calculated	by	the	market-adjusted	model.		
	
5.2	Long-run	Event	Study	
	
The	 buy-and	 hold	 abnormal	 returns	 (BHARs)	method	 is	 implemented	 to	 test	whether	
sell-offs	create	shareholder	value	on	the	long	run.	Once	again	daily	historical	stock	price	
data	 for	 each	 announcement	 and	 the	 respective	 data	 of	 the	 S&P500	 Index	 were	
collected	for	6,	12,	18	and	24	months	(125,	250,	375	and	500	days)	subsequent	to	the	
event	date.	The	buy-and-hold	abnormal	returns	for	firm	𝑖	in	period	T	is:	
	 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅!,! =  (1+ 𝑅!,!)!!!! −  (1+ 𝑅!,!)!!!! 	
	
where	𝑅!,!		 is	the	time	𝑡	actual	logarithmic	return	on	seller	𝑖	of	the	sample.	
	 𝑅!,!	 is	the	time	𝑡	actual	logarithmic	return	on	the	S&P	500	index.	
	
Next,	 t-statistics	 for	 the	different	normal	 return	estimation	procedures	are	calculated.	
As	a	result	of	the	employment	of	market	returns,	the	distribution	of	long-run	abnormal	
returns	 is	 positively	 skewed.	 To	 decrease	 the	misspecifications	 of	 t-statistics,	 the	 null	
hypothesis	of	Section	3.2	is	tested	using	the	skewness-adjusted	t-statistic	(Pastor-Llorca	
and	Martin-Ugedo,	2004).	The	formula	is	defined	as:	
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𝑡!"#$%#!!!!"#$%&'" =  𝑁 𝑆 +  13 𝛾𝑆! +  16𝑁 𝛾 	
	
where	N	is	the	sample	size	after	trimming	BHARs	by	2%	to	exclude	outliers.	
	 S= !"#!$![! (!"#$!)],		 where	𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅! 	is	 the	 sample	 mean	 of	 BHARs	 for	 the	
sample	N	and	𝜎 (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅!)	 is	 the	 sample	cross-sectional	
standard	deviation	of	BHARs	for	the	sample	N.	
	 𝛾	=	(!"#$!,!!!!"#$!,!)! !! (!"#$!)! 		 is	the	coefficient	of	skewness.	
	
	
5.3	Operating	Performance	Effects	Methodology	
	
The	methodology	involves	the	comparison	of	financial	ratios	of	the	firms	in	the	sample	
surrounding	the	year	 in	which	the	sell-off	announcement	took	place.	For	this	purpose,	
year	zero	is	defined	as	the	financial	year	in	which	the	sell-off	announcement	occurred,	
and	thus	year	-1	is	the	year	before	the	announcement,	and	year	+1	and	year	+2	are	the	
years	after	 the	announcement.	The	changes	will	be	 studied	 for	 four	different	periods,	
the	pre	event	period	(year	-1	to	year	0),	the	period	around	the	announcement	(year	-1	
to	year	+1),	the	post	event	period	(year	0	to	year	+1)	and	the	period	which	extends	from	
one	year	prior	the	announcement	to	two	years	past	the	announcement	(year	-1	to	year	
+2)		
The	characteristics	that	are	examined,	as	noted	in	Section	3.3,	are	related	to	the	
profitability,	the	liquidity,	the	leverage	and	the	efficiency	of	the	firms	in	the	sample.	The	
performance	of	the	firms	is	measured	by	the	return	on	assets	(ROA)	and	the	return	on	
equity	(ROE)	ratios,	the	efficiency	by	the	sales	to	total	assets	ratio,	the	liquidity	by	the	
cash	 to	 total	 assets	 ratio	 and	 the	 level	 of	 debt	 by	 the	 debt	 ratio	 (total	 debt	 to	 total	
assets).	Hence,	these	ratios	are	calculated	for	all	firms	of	the	sample	over	the	years	-1,	0,	
+1	and	+2.		
The	null	hypothesis	of	Section	3.3	 is	tested	by	the	two-tailed	t-statistic	and	the	
Wicoxon	 signed	 rank	 test.	 These	 tests	 are	 used	 to	 examine	 the	 mean	 and	 median	
differences	 of	 each	 ratio	 between	 the	 periods	 (-1,	 0),	 (-1,	 +1),	 (0,	 +1)	 and	 (-1,	 +2).	 In	
order	to	reduce	the	effect	of	outliers,	all	financials	were	trimmed	by	2%.	
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6.	Results	
	
This	 Section	 reports	 and	 analyzes	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 and	 compares	 the	 results	
with	the	existing	evidence	on	corporate	sell-offs.	
	
6.1	Short-term	Wealth	Effects	
	
Table	4	and	5	present	the	abnormal	returns	(ARs)	around	sell-off	announcements	over	
the	event	window	(-10,	+10)	using	both	the	market	and	the	market-adjusted	model	for	
the	total	sample	of	105	sell-offs	(Table	4)	and	the	sub-sample	of	73	sell-offs	(Table	5).	
The	results	for	the	full	sample,	as	depicted	in	Table	4,	indicate	that	both	models	
produce	 significant	 and	 almost	 identical	 abnormal	 returns	 of	 2.04	 and	 2.09%,	
respectively,	on	the	announcement	day.	Both	of	them	are	statistically	significant	at	the	
1%	 level,	 with	 a	 higher	 t-statistic	 for	 the	market	model	 (11.13)	 than	 for	 the	market-
adjusted	model	 (4.06).	 The	difference	 in	 the	value	of	 the	 t-statistics	 arises	due	 to	 the	
diversification	of	the	two	models.	In	addition,	the	statistically	significant	positive	ARs	for	
up	 to	 five	 days	 after	 the	 announcement	 date	 confirm	 the	 favorable	 market	 reaction	
towards	sell-offs.	
On	the	other	hand,	Table	5	shows	that	when	excluding	firms	with	contaminated	
announcements	within	the	(-10,	+10)	interval	from	the	sample,	the	ARs	are	even	larger.	
Again,	the	market	reaction	is	positive	on	the	announcement	day	for	both	models,	with	
statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level	ARs	of	2.75%	for	the	market	model	and	2.48%	for	
the	market-adjusted	model.	The	 lower	t-statistics	 for	the	sub-sample	compared	to	the	
full	 sample,	 are	 attributable	 to	 the	 smaller	 sample	 size	 used	 by	 the	 sub-sample.	
Furthermore,	 the	 positive	 ARs	 subsequent	 to	 the	 announcement	 day	 are	 statistically	
significant	only	at	the	5%	level	for	the	sub-sample.	
Overall,	both	samples	suggest	that	sell-offs	are	systematically	welcomed	by	the	
market	and	thus	result	 in	the	increase	in	the	wealth	of	selling	firms’	shareholders.	The	
comparison	 of	 the	 results	 with	 previous	 studies	 is	 given	 alongside	 the	 cumulative	
abnormal	returns.	
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Table	4	Abnormal	returns	surrounding	sell-off	announcements	for	the	full	sample	
	
	
Market	model	
	
Market-adjusted	model	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Day	 ARs	 t-value	
	 	
ARs	 t-value	
	-10	 -0.27%	 -1.46	
	 	
-0.21%	 -1.01	
	-9	 0.21%	 1.17	
	 	
0.19%	 1.37	
	-8	 -0.10%	 -0.55	
	 	
-0.15%	 -0.87	
	-7	 -0.52%	 -2.86	 ***	
	
-0.61%	 -2.83	 *	
-6	 0.04%	 0.20	
	 	
-0.05%	 -0.31	
	-5	 0.07%	 0.37	
	 	
0.07%	 0.55	
	-4	 0.25%	 1.36	
	 	
0.25%	 1.80	 *	
-3	 0.08%	 0.42	
	 	
0.06%	 0.39	
	-2	 -0.11%	 -0.61	
	 	
-0.18%	 -1.03	
	-1	 0.04%	 0.24	
	 	
0.13%	 0.93	
	0	 2.04%	 11.13	 ***	
	
2.09%	 4.06	 ***	
1	 0.31%	 1.67	 *	
	
0.21%	 0.54	
	2	 0.79%	 4.33	 ***	
	
0.76%	 3.41	 ***	
3	 -0.03%	 -0.15	
	 	
-0.15%	 -0.99	
	4	 0.08%	 0.42	
	 	
0.04%	 0.21	
	5	 0.52%	 2.87	 ***	
	
0.46%	 2.54	 **	
6	 -0.06%	 -0.32	
	 	
0.00%	 0.00	
	7	 0.18%	 0.96	
	 	
0.09%	 0.56	
	8	 -0.14%	 -0.79	
	 	
-0.21%	 -1.35	
	9	 0.24%	 1.31	
	 	
0.26%	 1.73	 *	
10	 -0.12%	 -0.67	
	 	
-0.15%	 -0.89	
	*,	**	and	***		denotes	statistical	significance	at	the	10,	5	and	1%	level	respectively	
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Table	5	Abnormal	returns	surrounding	sell-off	announcements	for	the	sub-sample	
	
	
Market	model	
	
Market-adjusted	model	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Day	 AR	 t-value	
	 	
AR	 t-value	
	-10	 -0.32%	 -0.93	
	 	
-0.23%	 -0.87	
	-9	 0.32%	 1.82	 **	
	
0.32%	 1.92	 *	
-8	 -0.22%	 -0.99	
	 	
-0.21%	 -1.11	
	-7	 -0.95%	 -2.70	 ***	
	
-0.87%	 -3.06	 ***	
-6	 -0.28%	 -0.88	
	 	
-0.15%	 -0.61	
	-5	 0.18%	 0.72	
	 	
0.06%	 0.34	
	-4	 0.40%	 1.51	
	 	
0.22%	 1.51	
	-3	 0.15%	 0.60	
	 	
0.09%	 0.42	
	-2	 -0.24%	 -0.84	
	 	
-0.31%	 -1.38	
	-1	 0.29%	 1.40	
	 	
0.24%	 1.31	
	0	 2.75%	 3.27	 ***	
	
2.48%	 3.44	 ***	
1	 0.21%	 0.41	
	 	
0.12%	 0.26	
	2	 0.76%	 2.42	 **	
	
0.65%	 2.49	 **	
3	 0.09%	 0.24	
	 	
-0.19%	 -1.07	
	4	 0.17%	 0.65	
	 	
0.16%	 0.70	
	5	 0.67%	 2.56	 **	
	
0.61%	 2.62	 **	
6	 -0.03%	 -0.16	
	 	
-0.05%	 -0.26	
	7	 -0.03%	 -0.16	
	 	
-0.04%	 -0.22	
	8	 -0.27%	 -1.62	
	 	
-0.25%	 -1.61	
	9	 0.45%	 1.79	
	 	
0.40%	 2.19	 **	
10	 -0.47%	 -1.26	 	 	 -0.26%	 -1.43	 	
*,	**	and	***		denotes	statistical	significance	at	the	10,	5	and	1%	level	respectively	
	
	
	
Table	6	shows	the	short-run	return	performance	of	sell-offs	measured	by	the	cumulative	
abnormal	 returns	 (CARs)	with	 both	 the	market	 and	 the	market-adjusted	model.	 CARs	
are	 given	 for	 several	 event	 windows,	 which	 are	 depicted	 in	 the	 first	 column,	 for	 the	
sample	 with	 contaminated	 announcements	 (Panel	 A)	 and	 for	 the	 sample	 without	
contaminated	announcements	(Panel	B).	
Although	 both	 models	 illustrate	 similar	 CARs,	 the	 results	 are	 statistically	
significant	 mainly	 for	 the	 market	 model	 approach.	 CARs	 are	 statistically	 significant	
positive	wealth	 gains	 for	 divesting	 firms	 of	 both	 samples	 for	 the	 event	windows	 (+1,	
+10),	(+1,	+5),	(-1,	+1)	and	(-1,	0).	In	the	pre	event	period	negative	CARs	are	observed	in	
the	(-10,	-1)	window	and	insignificant	positive	CARs	in	the	(-5,	-1)	window.	The	highest	
CARs	are	2.39%	for	 the	 full	 sample	and	3.30%	for	 the	sub-sample,	both	 in	 the	 (-1,	+1)	
event	 window.	 CARs	 in	 the	 -1	 to	 0	 event	 window	 have	 the	 greatest	 t-statistic	 with	
	 27	
respective	abnormal	return	and	t-statistic	values	of	2.08%	(8.04)	for	the	full	sample	and	
2.95%	 (7.06)	 for	 the	 sub-sample.	 The	 CARs	 of	 2.08%	 in	 the	 (-1,	 0)	 event	window	 are	
comparable	to	the	studies	of	Klein,	1986,	Hite	et	al.,	1987,	Hirschey	and	Zaima,	1989	and	
Sicherman	 and	 Pettway,	 1992,	 who	 also	 used	 the	 market	 model	 approach	 in	 their	
papers.	 Their	 findings	 reported	 CARs	 of	 0.72%,	 1.66%,	 1.65%	 and	 0.92%	 respectively.	
Despite	the	fact	that	this	study	reveals	greater	CARs	compared	to	prior	researches,	the	
results	show	that	sell-offs	create	shareholder	value	on	and	around	their	announcement.	
	
	
Table	6	Cumulative	abnormal	returns	around	the	announcement	date	
Panel	A	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Market	model	
	
Market-adjusted	model	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Period	 CARs	 t-value	
	 	
CARs	 t-value			
CAR	(-10,	-1)	 -0.31%	 -0.54	
	 	
-0.49%	 -0.61	
	CAR	(+1,	+10)	 1.76%	 3.05	***	
	
1.31%	 1.37	
	CAR	(-5,	-1)	 0.33%	 0.80	
	 	
0.34%	 0.98	
	CAR	(+1,	+5)	 1.67%	 4.09	***	
	
1.32%	 1.65	
	CAR	(-1,	+1)	 2.39%	 7.53	***	
	
2.43%	 1.27	
	CAR	(-1,	0)	 2.08%	 8.04	***	
	
2.22%	 1.14	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Market	model	
	
Market-adjusted	model	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Period	 CARs	 t-value	 		 		 CARs	 t-value			
CAR	(-10,	-1)	 -0.47%	 -0.50	
	 	
-0.83%	 -0.75	
	CAR	(+1,	+10)	 1.98%	 2.12	**	
	
1.13%	 1.05	
	CAR	(-5,	-1)	 0.74%	 1.12	
	 	
0.30%	 0.62	
	CAR	(+1	,+5)	 2.24%	 3.39	***	
	
1.34%	 1.68	*	
CAR	(-1,	+1)	 3.30%	 6.44	***	
	
2.84%	 1.23	
	CAR	(-1,	0)	 2.95%	 7.06	***	
	
2.72%	 1.22	
	*,	**	and	***		denotes	statistical	significance	at	the	10,	5	and	1%	level	respectively	
	
	
6.2	Long-term	Wealth	Effects	
	
Table	7	illustrates	the	long-run	return	performance	of	sell-off	announcements	based	on	
buy-and-hold	abnormal	 returns	 (BHARs)	over	6,	 12,	 18	and	24	months	 (125,	 250,	 375	
and	500	days)	subsequent	to	the	event	date	(day	zero).	Again,	the	table	is	horizontally	
separated	into	the	part	which	shows	the	results	for	the	overall	sample	(Panel	A)	and	the	
sub-sample	(Panel	B).	
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The	findings	reveal	negative	and	statistically	insignificant	buy-and-hold	abnormal	
returns	for	all	the	time	horizons	and	for	both	samples.	The	results	are	partly	in	line	with	
Lee	and	Lin,	2008,	which	also	 find	negative	but	 statistically	 significant	BHARs	 for	 their	
sample	of	UK	 sell-offs.	 For	 the	12	months	 following	 the	deal,	 BHARs	 seem	 to	 recover	
from	 the	 return	 performance	of	 the	 first	 six	months	 after	 the	 sell-off	 announcement.	
The	respective	increase	from	-3.12%	to	-1.28%	for	the	full	sample	and	from	-3.34%	to	-
1.50%	for	the	sub-sample	may	imply	that	the	proceeds	from	the	sell-offs	gradually	result	
in	the	improvement	of	the	firms’	operating	performance	and	thus	the	market	responses	
positively	 to	 the	 firms.	 As	 Francoeur	 and	 Niyubahwe,	 2008	 report,	 BHARs	 are	
significantly	 and	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 allocation	 efficiency	 of	 the	 firms’	 internal	
capital	 market.	 Lastly,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 adjusted	 t-statistic	 18	 months	 after	 the	
annoucement	 indicate	 that	 the	negative	buy-hold-abnormal	 returns	of	 that	period	are	
not	driven	by	the	sell-off	but	rather	by	other	activities	of	the	firms.	
	
	
Table	7	Buy-and-hold	abnormal	returns	subsequent	to	sell-off	announcements	
Panel	A	
	 	 	 			 6	months	 12	months	 18	months	 24	months	
BHARs	 -3.12%	 -1.28%	 -4.71%	 -3.53%	
Adjusted	t-statistic	 -1.54	 -0.32	 -0.94	 -0.58	
	 	 	 	 	Panel	B	
	 	 	 			 6	months	 12	months	 18	months	 24	months	
BHARs	 -3.34%	 -1.50%	 -7.93%	 -5.90%	
Adjusted	t-statistic	 -1.26	 -0.30	 -1.52	 -0.87	
	
	
	
6.3	Post-Sell-off	Operating	Performance	
	
Table	 8	 and	 Table	 9	 present	 the	 firms’	 performance	 in	 terms	 of	 profitability,	 as	
measured	by	ROA	and	ROE,	before	and	after	the	sell-off.	Both	tables	report	the	results	
for	the	full	sample	(Panel	A)	and	for	the	sub-sample	(Panel	B).	
The	analysis	of	the	profitability	of	the	parent	firms	shows	insignificant	mean	and	
median	changes	for	both	ratios	and	for	all	periods.	The	higher	mean	changes	of	the	full	
sample	compared	to	the	sub-sample	indicate	that	other	events	surrounding	the	sell-off	
influences	 these	 deviations.	 While	 the	 increase	 in	 profitability	 in	 the	 year	 of	 the	
announcement	can	be	explained	by	the	decline	in	assets	in	that	year,	the	higher	ratios	in	
year	+1	and	+2	compared	to	year	0	suggest	that	firms	manage	to	keep	their	profitability	
levels	at	a	greater	rate	after	the	sell-off.		
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Table	8	Return	on	assets	(ROA)	surrounding	the	announcement	year	
Panel	A	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 1.56	 3.29	 2.81	 2.65	
	
Mean	change	 1.73	 -0.47	 1.25	 1.09	
Median	 3.56	 4.15	 4.18	 2.75	
	
p	value	 0.261	 0.748	 0.411	 0.452	
Observations	 103	 103	 103	 103	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.228	 0.652	 0.520	 0.442	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 1.71	 2.46	 2.21	 1.47	
	
Mean	change	 0.76	 -0.26	 0.50	 -0.24	
Median	 3.56	 4.15	 4.18	 2.48	
	
p	value	 0.697	 0.900	 0.792	 0.892	
Observations	 71	 71	 71	 71	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.663	 0.952	 0.783	 0.747	
*,	**	and	***		denotes	statistical	significance	at	the	10,	5	and	1%	level	respectively	
	
	
Table	9	Return	on	equity	(ROE)	surrounding	the	announcement	year	
Panel	A	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 3.17	 8.61	 5.69	 5.58	
	
Mean	change	 5.44	 -2.91	 2.52	 2.41	
Median	 8.39	 10.08	 12.54	 8.51	
	
p	value	 0.172	 0.462	 0.573	 0.595	
Observations	 102	 101	 102	 98	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.162	 0.868	 0.131	 0.355	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 2.74	 5.08	 3.78	 3.53	
	
Mean	change	 2.34	 -1.30	 1.04	 0.79	
Median	 7.47	 9.83	 9.09	 4.15	
	
p	value	 0.591	 0.768	 0.826	 0.850	
Observations	 70	 69	 70	 68	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.830	 0.925	 0.240	 0.913	
*,	**	and	***		denotes	statistical	significance	at	the	10,	5	and	1%	level	respectively	
	
	
Table	10	displays	the	variation	in	the	performance	of	the	parent	firms’	efficiency	levels,	
as	measured	by	the	sale	to	assets	ratio,	surrounding	the	announcement	year	for	the	full	
sample	(Panel	A)	and	for	the	sub-sample	(Panel	B).	
Test	 results	 of	 the	 sellers’	 efficiency	 depict	 insignificant	 mean	 and	 median	
changes	of	the	sales	to	total	assets	ratio	for	both	samples	and	for	all	the	periods	under	
investigation.	The	lower	figures	in	year	0	in	contrast	to	the	respective	figures	in	year	-1	
shows	 that	 both	 sales	 and	 total	 assets	 dropped	 due	 to	 the	 sell-off.	 However,	 the	
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numbers	in	the	following	years	imply	that	the	firms	are	able	to	return	to	the	efficiency	
rates	they	had	in	the	year	before	the	announcement.		
	
	
Table	10	Sales	to	total	assets	surrounding	the	announcement	year	
Panel	A	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 0.87	 0.83	 0.86	 0.85	
	
Mean	change	 -0.04	 0.03	 -0.01	 -0.02	
Median	 0.80	 0.79	 0.76	 0.75	
	
p	value	 0.546	 0.629	 0.905	 0.817	
Observations	 103	 103	 103	 103	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.437	 0.125	 0.702	 0.415	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 0.89	 0.85	 0.87	 0.86	
	
Mean	change	 -0.04	 0.02	 -0.02	 -0.03	
Median	 0.82	 0.84	 0.78	 0.75	
	
p	value	 0.612	 0.794	 0.809	 0.698	
Observations	 71	 71	 71	 71	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.977	 0.289	 0.920	 0.512	
*,	**	and	***		denotes	statistical	significance	at	the	10,	5	and	1%	level	respectively	
	
	
Table	11	points	out	the	alterations	in	the	parent	firms’	liquidity	levels	respective	to	the	
performance	on	the	announcement	year.		
Mean	 and	 median	 changes	 of	 the	 selling	 firms’	 liquidity	 levels,	 which	 are	
measured	by	the	cash	to	total	assets	ratio,	turn	out	positive	but	overall	insignificant.	The	
higher	ratio	on	the	announcement	year	than	on	the	year	before,	 is	attributable	to	the	
simultaneous	 increase	 in	 cash	and	decrease	of	assets,	 as	a	 result	of	 the	 sell-off.	 From	
then	on,	 firms	show	to	maintain	 their	 liquidity	 levels	above	 the	rates	 that	 they	had	 in	
the	year	before	the	announcement.	
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Table	11	Cash	to	total	assets	surrounding	the	announcement	year		
Panel	A	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 15.13	 16.71	 17.15	 16.95	
	
Mean	change	 1.59	 0.43	 2.02	 1.82	
Median	 14.50	 14.21	 13.50	 14.66	
	
p	value	 0.315	 0.808	 0.205	 0.253	
Observations	 103	 103	 103	 103	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.281	 0.786	 0.04*	 0.376	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 15.67	 17.40	 18.16	 17.81	
	
Mean	change	 1.72	 0.77	 2.49	 2.14	
Median	 15.21	 14.41	 13.50	 15.08	
	
p	value	 0.366	 0.731	 0.206	 0.264	
Observations	 71	 71	 71	 71	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.667	 0.441	 0.096	 0.208	
*,	**	and	***		denotes	statistical	significance	at	the	10,	5	and	1%	level	respectively	
	
	
Table	12	shows	the	pre-	and	post-performance	of	sellers’	 leverage	levels,	as	measured	
by	the	debt	ratio,	for	the	full	sample	(Panel	A)	and	the	sub-sample	(Panel	B).	
The	mean	and	median	changes	of	the	debt	ratio	turn	out	statistically	significant	
for	the	full	sample	in	the	period	(-1,	+2)	for	the	mean	and	in	the	periods	(0,	+1)	and	(-1,	
+2),	for	the	median.	For	the	remaining	periods,	almost	all	mean	and	median	changes	are	
positive,	 but	 not	 statistically	 significant	 for	 any	 sample.	 The	 small	 difference	 in	 the	
period	 (-1,	 0)	 for	 the	 full	 sample	 and	 the	 respective	 negative	 difference	 for	 the	 sub-
sample,	show	that	despite	the	fact	that	firms	have	a	lower	amount	of	assets	in	year	zero	
compared	to	year	 -1,	 the	ratio	remained	almost	even	for	 the	full-sample	and	dropped	
for	the	sub-sample.	Therefore,	the	results	imply	that	firms	improve	their	leverage	due	to	
the	sell-off.	
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Table	12	Debt	ratio	surrounding	the	announcement	year		
Panel	A	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 16.70	16.92	 18.69	 21.26	
	
Mean	change	 0.22	 1.78	 2.00	 4.57	
Median	 17.73	15.62	 18.97	 22.16	
	
p	value	 0.919	 0.441	 0.369	 0.043*	
Observations	 103	 103	 103	 103	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.332	 0.030*	 0.202	 0.002***	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 14.84	14.35	 16.19	 18.99	
	
Mean	change	 -0.49	 1.85	 1.36	 4.15	
Median	 13.00	 8.85	 14.94	 18.93	
	
p	value	 0.847	 0.486	 0.609	 0.112	
Observations	 71	 71	 71	 71	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.070	 0.217	 0.959	 0.059	
*,	**	and	***		denotes	statistical	significance	at	the	10,	5	and	1%	level	respectively	
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7.	Conclusion	
	
This	 study	examines	 the	short-	and	 long-run	return	performance	of	corporate	sell-offs	
announcements	 using	 a	 sample	 with	 contaminated	 announcements	 and	 a	 sample	
without	overlapping	events	10	days	prior	and	10	days	after	the	announcement	day.	The	
research	 questions	 are	 whether	 sell-offs	 are	 producing	 shareholder	 gains	 on	 their	
announcement	and	on	the	two-year	post	sell-off	announcement	period.	Moreover,	the	
changes	in	the	operating	performance	of	the	firms,	before	and	after	the	announcement	
year,	are	evaluated	in	order	to	identify	if	sell-offs	are	positively	connected	to	increasing	
firm	performance.	
In	 terms	 of	 short-run	 shareholder	 wealth,	 the	 results	 provide	 evidence,	
consistent	with	prior	 findings,	 that	 sell-off	announcements	are	generating	significantly	
positive	abnormal	returns	for	the	shareholders	of	the	selling	firms.	Abnormal	returns	of	
2.04%	 for	 the	 full	 sample	 and	 2.75%	 for	 the	 sub-sample	 are	 observed	 on	 the	 initial	
announcement	day,	concluding	that	sell-offs	generate	gains	on	their	announcement.		
With	 respect	 to	 long-run	 shareholder	 wealth,	 although	 negative	 abnormal	
returns	for	up	to	two	years	following	the	initial	announcement	are	observed	for	6,	12,	
18	and	24	months	after	the	initial	announcement,		their	increase	from	-3.12%	to	-1.28%	
for	 the	 full-sample	 and	 from	 -3.34%	 to	 -1.50%	 for	 the	 sub-sample	 between	 6	 and	 12	
months	 after	 the	 announcement	propose	 that	 shareholders	 are	 rewarded	 if	 the	 firms	
use	the	proceeds	from	the	sell-off	efficiently.	
Regarding	 the	 post	 performance	 of	 the	 selling	 firms,	 despite	 the	 insignificant	
mean	 and	 median	 changes	 in	 the	 firms’	 operating	 performance	 reported	 for	 several	
periods	around	 the	announcement	year,	 the	 results	of	 the	analysis	 show	that	 sell-offs	
are	positively	associated	with	the	improvement	in	the	firms’	post	profitability,	 liquidity	
and	leverage	levels	and	contribute	to	the	maintenance	of	their	efficiency	levels.	
In	 conclusion,	 this	 study	 shows	 that	 sell-offs	 are	 generally	 value-enhancing	
decisions	for	shareholders.	Shareholders	enjoy	significant	positive	wealth	gains	around	
their	 announcement	 day(s)	 and	 benefit	 also	 in	 the	 long	 run	 when	 internal	 capital	
markets	are	allocated	efficiently.	Further,	sell-offs	tend	to	improve	the	selling	firms’	post	
operating	performance,	which	is	positively	related	to	their	shareholders’	interest.	
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